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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ARCHIE CLARENCE PACE, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
vs 
BROOKFIELD PRODUCTS, INC. 
et al., 
Defendant-Appellant 
C^se No. 14542 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-Respondent foreclosed onj a mortgage and named 
Defendant-Appellant as a party holding a second mortgage. Plain-
tiff-Respondent assigned its interest in the mortgage to Kamas 
State Bank. Defendant-Appellant countere1aimed against Plain-
tiff-Respondent on an alleged open account. 'Tie counterclaim of 
the Defendant-Appellant is the only issue. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT 
The case came before Honorable Marcellus K. Snow on 
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. At the close of the 
argument the Court granted Plaintiff's Motion. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks to have judgment of the 
lower court affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
Plaintiff Archie Clarence Pace brought an action a-
gaint defendants Brookfield, Larry F. Pace (plaintiff's son) and 
Sharee F. Pace (hereinafter referred to as defendants Pace) and 
Kamas State Bank (hereinafter referred to as Bank), alleging 
that defendants Pace had executed and delivered to plaintiff a 
promissory note and mortgage and subsequently had defaulted there-
on. Plaintiff1s action was brought to foreclose on said mortgage. 
Defendant Brookfield and the Bank were named as parties to the 
action because of their alleged lien and/or interest in the prop-
erty subject to the mortgage. Plaintiff Archie Pace assigned his 
interest in the note and mortgage to Kamas State Bank. 
Defendant Brookfield answered denying each and every 
paragraph of plaintiff's complaint and counterclaimed against 
plaintiff, alleging that plaintiff had purchased and accepted 
from defendant Brookfield certain merchandise, the cost of which 
totaled $15,434.45, that plaintiff had failed to pay for said 
merchandise, and that plaintiff was indebted to defendant Brook-
field in that amount. 
Plaintiff answered said counterclaim alleging that any 
amounts due defendant Brookfield from plaintiff had been satis-
fied and that there had been a complete accord and satisfaction. 
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From the interrogatories and requests for admissions 
it is clear that the following facts existed and there is no dis-
pute regarding them. 
1. Defendant-Appellant had sales receipts and ledger 
cards showing charges, payment and balance of the Pace account. 
That as payments were made they were applied to the balance due. 
2. That on March 1, 1973, there was a balance due of 
Fifteen Thousand Four Hundred Thirty-Four anld 35/100 ($15,434.35) 
Dollars in the name of plaintiff-respondent Archie Clarence Pace. 
That thereafter the account was carried forward in the name of 
Larry Pace, the new owner, and the payments £nd charges were con-
tinued as before. 
3. That under the theory of first in, first out, the 
Fifteen Thousand Four Hundred Thirty-Four and 35/100 ($15,434,35) 
Dollars due March 1, 1973, had been paid long before defendant-
appellant brought suit on its counterclaim iiji this action. 
4. That on January 31, 1975, the defendant-appellant 
took a note and mortgage from Larry C. Pace and Sharee F. Pace in 
the sum of Twenty Nine Thousand ($29,000.00) Dollars which sum in-
cluded all the balance of the Pace account. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UNDER THEORY OF "FIRST IN FIRST OUT DOCTRINE0 THE OBLIGATION OF 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT HAS BEEN PAID 
It is a general rule of law applie4 in practically all 
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jurisdictions where the question has arisen that when there is an 
open account and there are several charges and payments that the 
payments are applied to the oldest charges or debt. Cases from 
most jurisdictions and from both Federal and State Courts support 
this rule. 
"Where creditor and debtor have not specified how 
payments are to be applied and circumstances do 
not require a different application the payments 
are applied under the doctrine of ffirst in, first 
outr" Lowden v. Northwestern National Bank and 
Trust Company of Minneapolis C. C. A. Minn. , 84 F. 
2d 847.— 
"Under the 'first in, first out doctrine' in case of 
payment by a debtor to one who is his creditor upon 
distinct transactions, and for different amount when 
neither party makes an appropriation at the time, 
the payments are applied by law to the liabilities 
of earliest date." Saltonstall v. Hassett, D. C. 
Mass. , 32 F. Supp 58T. 
"The 'first in, first out doctrine' is generally 
applied to cases involving running accounts between 
debtor and creditor which include numerous debits and 
credits, and is applied because it is presumed to 
be in the intention of the parties in the ordinary 
and the usual course of business." Saltonstall v. 
Hassett, D. C. Mass., 32 F. 2d Supp 583. 
"Where there is a running account, creditor may 
apply debtor's payment to any item, and general 
creditors on such accounts stand as payment on old-
est items of such counts unless some other applica-
tion is clearly indicated." Hollywood Wholesale 
Electric Company v. Jack Baskin Inc., 303 P 2d 1049. 
"Where there are various items of debit on running 
account, payment made must be applied to earliest 
obligations if there is no specification by debtor 
or creditor as to its application." West's Ann. 
Civ. Code 1479. Oregon Cedar Products Co. v. 
Ramos & Kohler 307 P. 2d 447. 
A Texas case of 1974 stated the rule again as follows: 
"In the absence of direction or argument as to the 
- 5 -
application, payment will be applied as a matter of 
law to the oldest debt if no specific application of 
the payment as been made to any particular account 
or to any particular part of an account." Peden v 
Carpenter 516 S. W. 2d 19. 
Arizona recognizes the same rule as the other juris-
dictions. A 1974 case held: 
"In the absence of direction by a debtor a creditor 
may apply payments made by the debtor to such por-
tions of the debt as he prefers; where no special 
application has been made it is appliable to a run-
ning account." Holt v. Western Farm Service 517 
P 2d 1272. 
Maryland is also in agreement with the general rule 
of law. In a recent 1973 case the court ruled: 
"Absence agreement of parties as to the allocation 
of payments to creditors holding two or more ob-
ligations of creditor, if neither debtor or creditor 
makes allocation the law makes allocation to the 
oldest or least secured obligation." CIark-King 
Const. Co. Inc., v. Salter 307 A 2d 48T! 
POINT II 
IT WAS THE INTENTION OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT TO APPLY THE PAYMENTS 
TO THE OLDEST PART OF THE DEBT 
The cases are clear that the payments are to be ap-
plied to the oldest debt unless either the debtor or creditor 
makes known a different intention. The practice of applying pay-
ments to the charges was followed by the creditor and the two 
Paces and no one indicated any different intention. In fact, 
the defendant-appellant indicated an approval of the system by 
taking a note and mortgage from Larry Pace for the entire bal-
ance then due. The note and security should have been less than 
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half than it was if plaintiff's balance of March 1973 had been 
ommitted. Larry Pace in signing the note and mortgage showed 
his intention and approval of the "first in, first out doctrine." 
Archie Clarence Pace's portion had long since been paid and 
what remained was the sole debt of Larry Pace. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts in this case are not in dispute. The 
District court was right when it granted judgment and this Court 
should affirm the lower court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
J HAROLD CALL 
Attorney for Respondent 
30 North Main Street 
Suite No. 3 
Heber City, Utah 84032 
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